Up With Torts

JOSEPH W. LITTLE*

A reply to Professor Sugarman.

In his recent works, Professor Sugarman has advocated two major

measures: first, the abolition of the law of torts,1 and second, the

institution of a comprehensive system to compensate victims of acci-

dents. 2 My purpose is to repudiate Sugarman's first goal. He is fac-

tually wrong in his view of what the law of torts is all about 3 and
politically wrong in his desire to eliminate individual responsibility
and personal accountability as the major premises in civil regulation
of human behavior. Apart from this objection, I have much sympa-

thy with his general desire to see accident victims helped.
Although Professor Sugarman has receded somewhat from his
stark proposal to abolish the law of torts, he has not retreated from
his fixation upon compensatory efficiency, whether in terms of the
comprehensiveness of the benefits awarded, their proportionality to
the actual harm done, or the amount of overhead costs as the decisional criterion.' If one starts with the premise that the law of torts
* Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law. B.S. 1957, Duke University; M.S. 1961, Worcester Polytechnic Institute; J.D. 1963, University of Michigan.
1. Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555 (1985) [hereinafter Sugarman, Tort Law], and Serious Tort Law Reform, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
795 (1987) [hereinafter Sugarman, Tort Reform].
2. Sugarman, Tort Reform, supra note 1. Sugarman's "serious" tort reform is
emasculation surrounded by an employment-based compensation plan.
3. Professor Sugarman starts his article with the statement, "Tort law is a form
of collective intervention into social and economic affairs ..
" Id. at 795. As this article demonstrates, a claim of accuracy for that statement can be made only at the highest
level of abstraction. This represents the key fault of Professor Sugarman's approach.
When you start from the wrong station, it is hard to get to the correct destination.
4. Sugarman, Tort Reform, supra note 1, at 798-801.

was invented, if you like, as a system for alleviating all harm done
by accidental causes (or even by intentional causes under Professor
Sugarman's most expansive view), then Professor Sugarman's criticisms are cogent, on point, and nigh irrefutable. If a comprehensive
compensation system is what one is looking for, the law of torts is a
crazy model to emulate. Moreover, if one is forced to take the law of
torts and convert it into a comprehensive compensation plan-a task
not unlike fitting a square peg in a round hole-then Professor
Sugarman's approach is worthy of consideration as a place to start
the conversation.
Although I would have some criticism of Professor Sugarman's
plan in its own terms, my disagreement is more fundamental than
that. It is historically, functionally and culturally wrong to think of
tort law as a comprehensive compensation system. I say this with full
understanding that many of the modern innovations in the law of
torts have been devised to enlarge the compensatory reach of the
law. While many of those measures were adopted in good faith, they
were grounded on the mistaken belief that because the law of torts
did not satisfy the reformers' compensatory urges, its compensatory
potential ought to be expanded. One consequence of this has been to
distort the law of torts into the system that Professor Sugarman
deems to be weirdly quixotic and intolerably costly in the manner in
which it compensates victims of injuries. Another possible consequence may have been to thwart the development of nontort compensation systems that effectively would serve the essential compensatory goals that are his apparent first love.
To perceive comprehensive compensation as the prime goal of tort
law is to confound consequence and purpose. Professor Steven D.
Smith of the University of Idaho has shown the fallacy in this thinking.5 It really cannot be deemed to be logic because the compensationists, by and large, merely have assumed their conclusions rather
than reached them through logical argumentation or historical proof.
Indeed, Professor Sugarman convincingly illuminates the inadequacies of tort law when, in the process of discussing what a comprehensive compensation system ought to be, he effectively proves that its
main purpose always must have been something quite different.
Demonstrating this more directly, Professor Smith concludes that
the prime purpose of tort law is to resolve civil disputes.,
While I thoroughly agree with Professor Smith's debunking of the
assumption that tort law is meant to be a compensation plan, the
depiction of the law of torts as a dispute resolution system is at once
5. Smith, The Critics and the "Crisis'" A Reassessment of Current Conceptions
of Tort Law (manuscript on file with the author) (1987).
6. Id.
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too broad and too narrow. It is too broad in that the system of adjudicating civil disputes subsumes tort law issues and not vice versa.
The goal of tort law is independent of the method of resolving tort
disputes. On the other hand, Professor Smith's depiction of tort law
as a dispute resolution system is too narrow in that it does not provide concrete premises for criticizing and altering the substantive
law when and as needed. Without having a more firmly defined
statement of what tort law is about, we cannot adequately assess its
operation, much less improve it.
What, then, is the goal of tort law? What I will state here draws
upon the teachings of a great many tort judgments, particularly
those issued in the formative days of the modern law of torts, and of
books and materials that tie the historical evolution of the common
law to the historical underpinnings of democratic governance and
classical liberalism (for example, minimal government, self-determination, freedom of conscience, personal accountability, and private
ownership of property) in England and the United States.
Nothing about it would surprise or be disputed by any generation
of tort lawyers, save perhaps some in the present generation. The
crystallization of the common law of torts occurred at a time when
people were deciding to be free - free from overweening control of
a dictatorial monarchy in private matters, and free from subjugation
to ecclesiastical authorities in secular affairs. The subsidence of the
pervasive authority of the state (the monarchy) and the church, as
well as the emergence of self-governance, gave rise to the need for
popular mechanisms by which the social body could regulate behavior predictably and guard its members against the ravages of extreme antisocial episodes. The criminal law afforded one measure of
control, but its too heavy reliance upon state intervention was at
odds with the basic desire to minimize state control. The law of torts
afforded another avenue of control that was in keeping with the
premises of democracy and classic liberalism.
Several features of tort law made it fit well within these boundaries. Apart from the relatively tiny sphere of operation of the criminal law, restraining behavior through tort law leaves most human
behavior free of regulation by state officials and rules. Further, the
citizenry decides which modes of human behavior are too extreme to
be tolerated in an organized society. Indeed, the common law itself,
of which the law of torts is no insignificant element, is derived by
and large from the common sense and ideals of the populace, and
not from the dictates of the sovereign. Finally, ordinary people play

a key role in drawing the line that separates tolerable from intolerable behavior, and in prescribing the remedies for wrongful acts. This
role historically is the great virtue of the jury system7 that remains a
powerful force in the United States, although it is largely unused in
civil litigation in modern England.
The resulting structure of the law of torts did not evolve in orderly
progression, nor do all the pieces fit together without inconsistencies
and imperfections. Very little about the common law and democratic
governance emerges by text book logic. Any system that is founded
on democratic decisions, minimal state control, individual responsibility, and personal accountability is bound to be imperfect. (The
only just claim to perfection might be in the Churchillian sense that
the system expresses its premises better than any alternative yet devised.) It is on these grounds that Professor Sugarman's views and
mine depart most sharply: he would opt for state control because he
cannot abide the imperfections, particularly the economic inefficiencies, of a largely unregulated system, and also to achieve his comprehensive compensatory desires; I opt for a system based on those
other premises previously mentioned. Although limiting the excesses
and profligacies is correct, I prefer to pay the economic and social
cost of being free of state control.
In keeping with the basic premise of freedom, the purpose of the
law of torts is to serve as a lawful civil mechanism to separate intolerable extremes of human behavior from the vast bulk of behavior
that society tolerates. As Holmes put it, "[t]he business of the law of
torts is to fix the dividing line between those cases in which man is
liable for harm which he has done, and those which he has not." 8 By
and large the truncation is based upon notions of wrong. "Negligence," asserted Cardozo in Palsgraf,"is not a tort unless it results
in the commission of a wrong, and the commission of a wrong imports the violation of a right. .

. ."'

Moreover, what makes an ac-

tion wrongful, according to Lord Adkin in his venerated Donoghue v.
Stevenson judgment, is "based upon a general public sentiment of
7. One of the best descriptions of the role of the jury is that of Judge Hunt in
Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 663-64 (1837):
Twelve men of the average of the community, comprising men of education
and men of little education, men of learning and men whose learning consists
only in what they have themselves seen and heard, the merchant, the mechanic,
the farmer, the laborer; these sit together, consult, apply their separate experience of the affairs of life to the facts proven, and draw a unanimous conclusion.
This average judgment thus given it is the great effort of the law to obtain. It is
assumed that twelve men know more of the common affairs of life than does
one man, that they can draw wiser and safer conclusions from admitted facts
thus occurring than can a single judge.

8. O.W.

9.
(1928).

HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW

79 (1909).

Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 345, 162 N.E. 99, 101
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moral wrongdoing for which the offender must pay." 10 Defined in the
light of these premises and thousands of cases applying them, tortious wrongs comprise intentional, wanfon and malicious acts, negligent acts (as in Palsgrafand Donoghue), and also "non-natural"
acts that are inherently perilous to neighbors (Rylands v.
Fletcher)." By virtue of its civil character, tort law is activated by
private citizens. It supplies the procedural and substantive wherewithal for ordinary people to initiate actions to ascertain whether
others have overstepped these bounds to the detriment of the suitors.
In sum, the purpose of the law of torts is to place civil self-help
restraints on human behavior within the context and limits of individual responsibility and personal accountability in a democratic
society.
After the law of torts has "fixed" that line between liability and
impunity, what then? In a civil law system that depends upon the
initiative of wronged citizens to bring culpable citizens to account,
employing remedies that put things right between the disputing parties makes sense, and putting things right naturally seems to call for
restoring things as they were before the harm was done. This remedy
possesses the twin virtues of having a direct relationship to the
wrongful act and being true to the private nature of the process (as
opposed to, for example, some form of punishment or social retribution). It is no wonder, then, that restoring the status quo is the target
of the tort remedy after liability has been established. It likewise is
no wonder, given the absence of in specie restorative powers in judicial decrees, that compensation by the award of money has become
the typical tort remedy in actions involving injury to person and
property.
The nub of this argument is to show that compensation is not the
goal of tort law, but merely is the most practical remedial expression
yet discovered. Nevertheless, the remedy is subordinate to the true
operational goal of the law of torts, which remains to serve as a civil
law method of truncating unacceptable extremes of human behavior
from the remainder that must be left unfettered in a democratic free
society.
Many modern innovations in the application of the law of torts
have been predicated on the erroneous assumption that what I have
referred to as the "target" of the tort remedy is the essential goal of
tort law. Wrongly viewing the purpose of the law of torts as to com10. Donoghue v. Stevenson, 1932 A.C. 562, 580.
11. Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 352 (1868).

pensate virtually all injuries has caused some reformers to propose,
and some courts to impose, modifications to the substantive law that
are outside its true essential purpose. That essential purpose includes, for example, the common law rule that a plaintiff's own negligence bars recovery. After all, if individual responsibility, personal
accountability and minimal governmental intrusion are basic considerations, then a washing-the-hands denial of relief when all parties
are at fault is a justifiable response. 12 Comparative negligence, by
contrast, elevates compensation above its secondary role as remedy
for proven wrong to the status of first goal that justifies changing the
rules of liability. That the common availability of liability insurance
was a major factor in this change is no secret.ls Under this new plan,
more people are compensated, which if comprehensive compensation
is the goal, is a good thing. In the meantime the basic function of
tort law is ignored, and the law itself is made out to be a grotesque
and inefficient legal creature. This oversight, in turn, makes it convenient and acceptable for Professor Sugarman and others to advocate scrapping tort law altogether (or largely, as in his new plan). If
we wish to adhere to those tenets of minimal government, self-determination, freedom of conscience, personal accountability and the
like, adopting Professor Sugarman's plan would be an egregious
error.

Forcing the law of torts to be a prime compensator also forecloses
consideration of whether other justifiable distinctions might be made
in tort law without departing from its essential purpose. As an example, should the remedy vary in proportion to the moral culpability of
the act committed by the defendant? This question has seldom been
addressed. As an example, take the doctrine of product strict liability as expressed in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. Most courts provide the same remedies in section 402A actions as they do in negligence actions,1 4 but this approach is not required by any basic tort principle. There can be no serious question
that the roots of product strict liability (that is, what makes the defendant a civil wrongdoer) sink deep into the jurisprudence of Ry12. I realize the risk to credibility of challenging comparative negligence and do
not intend to undertake doing it here. Consequently, this point is made only for the purpose of illustration. This writer has examined the "Policy and Intellectual Justification
for the Contributory Negligence Rule" and of "Comparative Negligence" at another
place. Comparative Negligence, Law and Practice, §§ 1.10, 1.30 (1984).
13. See Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 55 U.S.L.W. 2603 (Fla. 1987),
wherein the Florida Supreme Court relies upon this interdependence to uphold a tort and
insurance law reform statute against a procedural attack under Florida's constitution.
14. 1 once suggested elsewhere that the law of products liability be rationalized to
subsume all actions under a common theory. Little, Rationalizationof the Law of Products Liability, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 1 (1984) reprinted in 9 J. PROD. LIAB. 37 (1986). I am
now inclined to believe that a remedial distinction should be made between negligence
and strict liability actions.

[VOL 24: 861, 1987]

Up With Torts
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

lands v. Fletcher and its antecedents. 15 There also can be no doubt
that Rylands mainly has been a doctrine intended to protect property interests. Not only do property losses ordinarily lack a component of general damages for pain and suffering, but the very conception of pain and suffering as an element of recovery also was
rudimentary when Rylands was decided. Perhaps section 402A is a
quite appropriate basis of tort liability, but thoughtlessly attaching
the same remedies to it that apply to actual wrongdoing is neither
necessary nor appropriate to serve the purpose of tort law.
Minimal infringement of freedom should be an overarching goal
both in fixing the line between liability and immunity and in providing a remedy. When a plaintiff has shown a defendant to have been
morally blameworthy (that is, a negligent, malicious or intentional
wrongdoer), then the law may be generous in its expression of the
make-whole remedy to protect the right of innocent people to be free
of tortious harms. When actual wrong is proved, we may safely err
on the remedial side for the plaintiff. By parity of reasoning, when
the plaintiff prevails on a strict liability theory without having
proved any actual wrongdoing, then in keeping with the desire not to
intrude too severely upon the basic premises of freedom, the law
might reasonably limit damages to proveable economic losses. In
short, when no actual wrong is proved, we might err on the remedial
side for the defendant (a plaintiff still could recover general damages
if he proved actual fault).
In the same vein as keeping tort law true to its essential purpose,
much can be said both for instituting a legitimate comprehensive
compensation system for all victims of accidental injury (not just for
employed victims as Professor Sugarman seems to propose), as well
as for imposing a regulatory framework (such as the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, the Food and Drug Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency) to impose economic
and criminal incentives upon institutionalized activities that pose endemic threats to segments of the general public. Although these propositions may seem to be at odds with certain of the basic premises
that I have extolled, particularly minimal government, the inconsistency vanishes upon close inspection. What is minimal depends upon
context. In deciding how far governmental intervention should go, we
15. Although the technical foundation for the seminal Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) rested on the California Civil Code, the path of swift absorption of the doctrine in common law jurisdictions
was prepared by common law strict liability.

must assess, first, the capacity of ordinary members of society to perceive, understand and protect themselves against risks, and, second,
their capacity to obtain redress through the self-help law of torts.
The first point largely is one of proportionality and mutuality."6 In
a free democracy the ordinary person with self-help as his only remedy legitimately may be expected to confront the risks that are proportional to his capacity to protect himself against and that also are
proportional to the risks of the sort he has the capacity to expose
others to. This is what I mean by proportionality and mutuality. The
more complex, interdependent, technical and institutional a society
becomes, the more likely large sectors of organized human activity
are to fall outside those bounds.
As to the second point, the more institutionalized activities become, the less likely is there to be a single human being who individually and personally is accountable for the institutional harm done to
a particular accident victim. The adequacy of self-help tort remedies
fades as flesh and blood defendants are replaced by phantom institutions. Hence, basic notions of individual responsibility ("I can take
care of myself") and personal accountability ("Or hold the wrongdoer accountable") lose much of their force. This justifies more state
intervention under the premise of minimal government. Indeed, government stands to lose its legitimacy when it provides inadequate
protection and relief from risks that are beyond the self-help coping
power of the typical citizen. Many risks in modern American life fall
into that category.
By the same token, the common law of torts loses force and legitimacy when pressed into service to do things it is unsuited to do, such
as to be the prime accident ompensation system, or to be the whip
that makes industry saner and safer. Professor Sugarman refers to
this loss of legitimacy when he tells of manufacturers withholding
beneficial products from markets, of recreational facilities being
idled, and of highly trained physicians giving up their specialties.'7
The upshot of this is that minimal government cannot stand back; it
must step forward to regulate as necessary to minimize injuries and,
if needed, to institute compensation schemes. Although the exact
contours of these measures should be worked out by the people
through their democratically elected representatives, the basic premises of freedom, individual responsibility and personal accountability
16. The mutuality criterion applies mainly to the common law of negligence and
its antecedents. Modern diversions from the fault requirement, such as strict products
liability and workers' compensation, came about largely because the lack of mutuality
rendered the common law of negligence inadequate on several grounds. Other tort doctrines such as common law strict liability (i.e., Rylands and intentional torts) were not
built upon a premise of mutality.
17. Sugarman, Tort Reform, supra note 1, at 796-97 & n.4.
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always must remain as the guiding principles.
None of this, however, makes it a good idea to bend the law of
torts out of shape in an effort to make it do things it was never
meant to do, or, after you have deformed it, to scrap it altogether.
Not only are the revered aspects of self-government offended by it,
but so are some elemental aspects of human nature that find legitimate expression in tort law.
A fundamental cultural point undervalued by "down with torts!"
proposals is the sense of moral culpability that lies at the heart of
the common law of torts. Damaged people want compensation; there
is no denying that. They also want accountability, which in a civilized society means access to a forum and a set of rules by which
they may publicly prove themselves right and someone else wrong.
This aspect of torts is wholly in keeping with the attribution of moral
blameworthiness to acts that the common law deems to be out of
bounds. Again, as Lord Atkin put it, "[t]he liability for negligence,
whether you style it such or treat it as in other systems as a species
of 'culpa,' is no doubt based upon a general public sentiment of
moral wrongdoing for which the offender must pay." 18 Even the California Supreme Court has referred to "the moral blame attached to
the defendant's conduct" as a factor in determining whether a duty
of care is owed.19
In ascribing public sentiment of moral blameworthiness to the law,
Lord Atkin was dealing with negligence, one of the least blameworthy, albeit economically most important, causes of action in the law
of torts. Public sentiment about intentional torts, defamation, conspiracy and all the rest is even sharper and more strongly focused,
imposing greater need for a healthy law of torts. Without it the expression of human anger, frustration, outrage, and even vengeance
will be denied a legitimate outlet, and occasions of illegal retaliation
and vigilantism may increase. One wise old South Carolina judge,
writing in the days when bloody duels were common, understood this
point well. Sadly noting that the "prevalent idea is that [insulting
and opprobrious words] should be remedied by a blow or with a bullet, and that is one of the reasons why it has been said so frequently
that human life in ,South Carolina is cheaper than five-cent cotton,"
he extolled the law of defamation as an alternative to "going out and
18. Donoghue, 1932 A.C. at 580.
19. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 1113, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr.
97, 100 (1968).

killing and shooting and beating up."2
Although almost three-fourths of a century has lapsed since that
comment was uttered, and our state authorities may enforce the laws
against "killing and shooting and beating up" more assiduously now
than they did in 1916, no one should believe that human emotions,
especially the desire for vindication, have changed. Indeed, if the
very proliferation of tort litigation that has caught Professor
Sugarman's eye tells us anything at all, it is that the modern drive
for vindication is perhaps more crystallized, better directed and more
demanding than ever before. Maybe this result is a synergistic consequence of a more uniform capacity of the general populace (not only
some elite) to assert legal rights and the growing remoteness and
impersonality of the institutions that are responsible for many of the
wrongs that are done in our society. Whatever the reason, no one
should believe that the urge for legal relief is limited to the reparative goals that could be served by a social compensation system. In
reply to a somewhat different suggestion for ignoring the human
condition, Cardozo once asserted that so "extravagant" a proposal
would require that "life.

.

. be made over, and human nature trans-

formed."'" Or, as Charles Dickens' earthy Mr. Bumble responded
when told that in the eye of the law his wife was assumed to act at
his direction, "If the law supposes that, the law is an ass - an idiot.
If that's the eye of the law, the law's a bachelor .... "I'
Although Professor Sugarman's desire to put down the law of torts
is both politically infeasible and culturally untenable, it nevertheless
reflects a legitimate belief that tort law is badly out of whack.
What's wrong with it? Perhaps the worst thing is that it has been
forced to be something it is not. But apart from that, the tort law
system indeed may cost too much when evaluated solely in the light
of valid compensatory goals, and, as has been demonstrated time and
again, its compensation is extravagant in a handful of cases and parsimonious in others. In addition, the law provides no compensation to
injuries not caused by legal wrongs. As argued throughout this paper, the last point may be a fault in our society, but it is not a fault
of the law of torts.
The recurring political "crises" in tort law have nothing to do with
cases of no compensation and undercompensation, but center on rising costs that many people attribute to changes in the law of torts.23
Looked at objectively and coldly, the realities of modern tort law
20. Lewis v. Williams, 105 S.C. 165, 169-70, 89 S.E. 647, 649 (1916).
21. Palsgraf,248 N.Y. at 343, 162 N.E. at 100. Judge Cardozo was reacting to
Judge Andrew's assertion that the driver of a car ought to have "prevision" that the car
ahead contained dynamite in its trunk.
22. C. DICKENS, OLIVER TwIsT ch. 51.
23. For this reason, this Article will examine only cost-driving factors.
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litigation reveal that juries have been inveigled into a pattern of
overgenerous compensation in some classes of cases, that the fee system imposed by both plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers strongly
stimulates litigation irrespective of the merits of the cases, that the
rules of law and damages lack substance and guidelines. The judiciary's failure to impose guiding restraints upon the law and legal proceedings has led the public to view tort law as a ravenous legal machine fixed more upon dollars than upon justice.
Although juries from time to time impose monumental damage
awards against defamers and intentional tortfeasors, the true concern about tort damages is centered upon negligence actions.
Whereas a few years ago, a million dollar negligence recovery was
an admired novelty and wholly unheard of in many jurisdictions,
multi-million dollar awards now are common occurrences almost
everywhere. In Florida, for example, the number of million dollar
awards rose from 169 in 1984 to 218 in the first three-quarters of
1985.24 In part, this rise reflects the cheapened value of the dollar,
but that can be only a fraction of the answer. The truth is that juries
(that is, the public) have been lulled or coached into treating the law
of torts as a wealth redistribution system rather than a system for
remedying proven wrongs.2 5 The virtual universality of liability insurance is a factor, permitting an inference that findings of liability
on slim grounds and overly generous awards harm no one person in
particular and, therefore, are not objectionable in general. Juries certainly cannot be expected to appreciate that their collective
overgenerosity would bear the extreme cultural cost that would be
imposed by Professor Sugarman's ultimate solution - namely, to
abolish the remedy itself.
The substantive law of damages imposes little discipline upon juries. The culprits, if such they be, are the rules of general damages
for pain and suffering, for grief, for loss of life expectancy, for loss of
24. Fla. B. News, Oct. 1, 1986, at 7.
25. Professor Sugarman and juries are not alone in succumbing to the flirtations of
those who apparently believe all of law, especially the law of torts, can be explained,
justified, criticized and modified on the basis of economic considerations alone. Even
without modern pedagogy, common law judges often used economic considerations in
prescribing rules of law. The judge-made doctrine of respondeat superior is a venerable
and important example that evidences judicial appreciation that economic considerations
sometimes influence the capacity of law to serve its essential purposes. This use of nonblameworthiness as a factor in tort liability is no invitation to stretch the theory beyond
the appropriate reach of its premises and empirical footings. See Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV.
1309 (1986).

the amenities of life and related consequences of grievous injuries.28
The lack of coherent guidelines as to how general damages, particularly pain and suffering, are to be evaluated, is far more serious.
Although some jurisdictions historically may have required a measured relationship between the amounts of compensatory and general
damages, and a few others may have permitted a comparison of
awards in similar cases, American jurisdictions by and large leave
the question of general damages to the "sound discretion" of juries.
Their findings are upset only where the jury was clearly inflamed by
bias or passion or made a finding that was completely outside of all
the evidence. These occasions are rare. Although employment of juries is a democratic virtue, the failure to guide them is a major flaw
of current American tort law. It needs to be fixed, and although exactly how to do it is beyond the scope of this comment, obliterating
is not fixing.
The inherent uncertainty of liability, the unjustified overgenerosity
of some general damage awards, and the generous compensation of
tort lawyers constitute massive economic incentives both to prosecute
tort actions and to draw out litigation. In sum, these factors may
impose monetary costs that are grossly disproportionate to the dollar
amounts finally delivered to the victims of wrongful acts and finally
lead Professor Sugarman to say that the tort system costs too much
and ought to be drastically pared back or scrapped. In addition, as
everyone knows, plaintiffs' lawyers typically handle tort litigation on
a contingent fee basis; if the plaintiff loses, he loses nothing but his
claim. Ordinarily, he will pay his attorney nothing for his time and
will not be required to pay the attorney of the prevailing party. So,
utilizing the system is monetarily risk free for plaintiffs, laying aside
the nonfee costs of litigation, which can be very large in some cases.
And, when the plaintiff prevails, the plaintiff's lawyer is handsomely
compensated with a large proportion of the recovery. These factors
often lead defendants to settle many claims of marginal liability, especially when a mammoth general damages award potentially exists.
Consequently, many plaintiffs' lawyers file nuisance value suits because of the slight economic risk 27 and of the prospect of a settlement, if not a substantial recovery. By virtue of all this, the economic welfare of the plaintiffs' bar has become inextricably intwined
with the operation of the substantive law of torts and massively influences the monetary cost of the system.
Although plaintiffs' lawyers bear the brunt of most of the public
26. Various jurisdictions differ widely as to which of these specific elements may
be individually claimed as an item of damage.
27. I acknowledge that plaintiffs' lawyers sometimes risk huge amounts in preparing lawsuits. These expenses often are lost if no recovery is made. To defray these costs is
the principal argument offered to justify contingent fees.
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criticism, defendants' lawyers are not without complicity in derailing
the law of torts from the track of essential justice. Defense lawyers
ordinarily are paid on the basis of a predetermined discrete rate per
measured quantum of work but they function with virtually unrestrained discretion to multiply the quanta at will. Insurance companies usually pay the bills and often prefer to have claims resolved in
the distant future rather than the present. The reason is transparent.

A one hundred dollar judgment paid a year from now equates to a
present liability of about ninety dollars.2" Hence, delay qua delay
often is a good thing for institutional defendants.
Defense lawyers also possess their own economic motivation to
slow the resolution of cases. Where not controlled by hardnosed
judges, modern motion and discovery practice provides plenteous opportunities for them to turn almost any claim into a paper battle,
producing harvests of thick files and fat bills. To them and their clients, the monetary risks of adding unjustified costs to the system are
nil.
Merely pointing fingers at jurors, lawyers and inadequate rules of
law as the villains in the undoing of the law of torts is neither complete nor wholly just. No complex, multifaceted mechanism can be
expected to operate with long term fidelity to basic goals without a
reliable overriding and governing agency. Whether it be the national
intercollegiate football program, the air traffic network, the public
schools system, or the law of torts, some steady hand must keep the
ship on course. In the case of tort litigation, the reliable and overriding governing agency is supposed to be the judiciary.2 9 Consequently,
although the law of torts may not now be reparable without legislative intervention, that does not remove the yoke of blame from the
judges .who permitted the ox to go into the ditch. Judges have failed
to prescribe concrete and restrained rules of law for damages, when
they could have done so. They have failed to prescribe more circumspect rules for setting attorney fees. And they have failed to discourage lawyers' tactics that are designed to produce delay and multiply
costs. Their failings are massive.
What can be done to get Professor Sugarman on the bandwagon
of "down with 'down with torts!' "? The job of proposing the solution
28. This inflation aspect of awards leaves aside those cases in which prejudgment
interest might be awarded. Also, in fairness I must report that insurance officials have
denied this in private conversation with the author.
29. 1 do not mean to suggest that legislatures have no role to play, but I do mean
that the judges are the shepherds of the common law and possess the power to keep it on
its course.

for any particular American jurisdiction is too much for this Article.
Accordingly, I merely will observe that every common law jurisdiction that I know about except American jurisdictions has avoided
most of these excesses. Though I do not mean to fall into the sophomoric trap of glorifying everything English or to pine unrealistically
for a return to the good old days of a "pure" fault system (which, of
course, never was), I would remind Professor Sugarman and other
critics of the law of torts that American law is the growth of a root
transplanted from England. Although American plaintiffs' lawyers
would criticize English law as stingy in its awards, no one to my
knowledge has made a colorable case that it does not adequately
carry out the historic goal of making wrongdoers pay the reasonable
compensatory value of injuries done by acts that the public would
deem to be morally blameworthy. And although the expense of litigation is a concern everywhere, I know of no one who has sought to
put down the law of torts because it costs too much for the goals it
serves. Moreover, and especially important, no one I am aware of
has proposed that the English law of torts is unnecessary or obsolete
by virtue of the fact that the United Kingdom employs a universal
health insurance program. 30 Indeed, looking only at the workers'
compensation element of the English program, one finds that, unlike
most American workers who have recourse only for workers' compensation benefits, English workers retain the right of taking compensation benefits and suing in tort.3 '
How have the English avoided criticisms such as those that Professor Sugarman and others level against the American system?
Cause can only be inferred and I must content myself with adducing
pieces of evidence. First, tort actions generally are tried before
judges and not juries.3 2 I do not mean to propose this as an American model, both because of the dubious constitutionality and also
because I believe jury involvement is a valuable democratic element
in the law. Nor do I think it to be a critical factor. Although trials of
disputed facts by judges may impose an element of structural discipline that is absent in American law, structural discipline could be
imposed by some other source. Second, English law imposes quite
rigorous restraints on general damage recoveries including elements
such as pain and suffering, grief and loss of the amenities of life.
30. See 23 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 250 (3d ed. 1971).
31. Actually, the English workers' compensation law has been supplanted by the
National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act of 1946, but the right to sue the employer
(without the fellow servant defense) remains. 35 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND
548-50 (3d ed. 1971) (especially general note at 549-50).
32. H. STREET, THE LAW OF TORTS 121 (1983). Juries still decide defamation
cases and perhaps a few other actions. See R. DIAS & B. MARKESINIS, THE ENGLISH
LAW OF TORTS: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 164 (1976) [hereinafter DIAS &
MARKESINIS].
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Indeed, the law usually permits a recovery of a conventional amount
of only a few tens of thousands of pounds at most.13 The conventional amount is regulated by reference to comparative cases and is
overseen by the Court of Appeals and the judicial committee of the
House of Lords. 4 It has not been permitted to grow like topsy without restraint. A suitably restrictive rule of law approach could be
made to work in American jurisdictions even with juries, and would
be especially appropriate for actions in which no actual fault is
proved. Third, English tort law has not been made to assume the illsuited task of being a comprehensive compensation plan. 35 Although
the English adopted comparative negligence by legislation long
before most American jurisdictions,3" English courts have been quite
reluctant to enlarge causes of actions on policy grounds that transcend traditional tort doctrines.37
Furthermore, the contingent fee is not known in the English law of
torts. Plaintiffs' lawyers, like defendants' lawyers, are paid on a piece
work basis.3 8 By American standards, the levels of compensation are
low (much to the chagrin of English lawyers who look enviously at
the rich fee system in this country). Moreover, under the English
level system, the prevailing party, whether plaintiff or defendant, is
entitled to have the loser taxed a reasonable amount for fees as a
part of costs. 39 Thus, English plaintiffs and plaintiffs' lawyers must
think hard about the ultimate merits of a matter before embarking
upon litigation.
Many American trial lawyers would label British tort law as
"primitive." Primitive it may be compared with the sheer mass, ornamentation and overhead costs of the American system, but who is
to say that it is primitive in performing the basic functions of the law
of torts? And, who is to say that even the primitive English (or Canadian or Australian) system of tort law is worse than having no
system of tort law at all? Certainly, from the American point of
view, English tort law could be improved, but that would not require
accepting the costly American approach.
In summary, Professor Sugarman's conception of what the law of
33.

See generally DIAS & MARKESINIS, supra note 32, at 219-21.

34.

See H.

STREET,

supra note 32, at 437.

35. J. FLEMING, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS 1 (1985).
36. The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1948, 8 & 9 Geo. ch. 28,
supplanted the all-or-nothing rule with comparative negligence.
37. H. STREET, supra note 32, at 8-9.

38.
39.

See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND WALES
3 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 1210 (4th ed. 1973).

§

124 (1985).

torts is all about is wrong. The law of torts is a big brick in our
foundation of democratic governance based upon tenets of minimal
government, individual responsibility and personal accountability.
Where it expresses these premises well, it ought to be preserved and
nurtured in doing its job of regulating behavior by civil self-help
means. Its cultural and political values far exceed whatever its apparent economic cost may be. So I deem Professor Sugarman's ultimate goal of scrapping the law of torts to be dangerously wrong.
By the same token, the law of torts may be revivified by eliminating its excesses, and needed nontort regulatory and compensation
programs, serving ends not within the reach of tort law, may be instituted. These goals are mutually supporting. Tort law cannot adequately regulate modern industry and perhaps other highly sophisticated activities, and it cannot be made to function reasonably as a
comprehensive accident compensation plan. Professor Sugarman's
plan has no general safety regulation element, so I will say nothing
more about it, and I have no inclination to criticize the details of a
comprehensive compensation plan that is built around a goal of dismantling the law of torts. I would suggest, instead, that Professor
Sugarman first devise a workable general accident compensation
scheme and then decide how the unruly overextension of the law of
torts might justifiably be pared back to serve its essential goals without trying to be something it is not. As for myself, I prefer to work
toward restoring the law of torts to its proper role and challenge the
welfare reformers to develop a compatible accident compensation
plan.
In spiritual league with Brutus, Professor Sugarman has come to
bury Caesar. My plea is that we revise and reform him,40 even if it
means cutting him down to size in the process. I say, "Up with
Torts!"

40.

By "him" I mean the law of torts, with apologies to the customary feminine.

